Abstract-In this paper, we consider the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BCCE), where a multi-antenna base station simultaneously communicates to multiple potentially malicious users, in the presence of randomly located external eavesdroppers. Using the proposed model, we study the secrecy rates achievable with regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding by performing a large-system analysis that combines results from stochastic geometry and random matrix theory, where the number of users K and the number of transmit antennas N both grow to infinity in a fixed ratio. We obtain explicit expressions for the probability of secrecy outage and an upper bound on the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers. We show that both these quantities scale as
perfect secrecy without requiring encryption keys [4] - [7] . This technique is known as physical layer security, and it has recently become a very active area of research.
A. Motivation and Related Work
The underlying channel for multiuser MIMO wireless communications is referred to as the MIMO broadcast channel (BC), where a central base station (BS) with N antennas simultaneously communicates to K users over the same frequency band. While it is known that dirty-paper coding (DPC) is a capacity achieving precoding strategy for the Gaussian MIMO BC [8] , the non-linearity of the DPC precoder makes it too complex to be implemented [9] , [10] . Linear strategies like regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding were proposed as a low-complexity alternative for practical systems [11] - [13] , and their performance was studied via a large-system approach that employs random matrix theory (RMT) tools [12] , [14] - [19] .
Physical layer security was considered to protect the confidentiality of data in the BC, by introducing the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC), where the users can act maliciously as eavesdroppers [20] - [24] . A large-system analysis of the secrecy rates achievable with RCI precoding in the BCC was performed via RMT tools in [25] - [27] , where eavesdropping was assumed from the malicious users only. The presence of external eavesdroppers and its effect on the secure connectivity in random wireless networks were studied, among others, in [28] - [32] via employing stochastic geometry (SG), but the system model did not account for the potentially malicious behavior of the users. Several contributions can be found in the literature on the secrecy rates achievable in Kuser interference channels (IFCs) with confidential messages and/or one external eavesdropper [33] - [37] . In the K-user IFC, each of K single-antenna transmitters sends one message to a single-antenna receiver, and the messages interfere with each other. However unlike the MISO BCC, in the IFC each transmit antenna performs independent processing, and the total number of transmit antennas must be equal to the number of users.
In a practical scenario, both malicious users and external nodes can act as eavesdroppers. A physical layer security system designed by considering either one of them should be regarded as vulnerable. In fact, a system designed considering the presence of external eavesdroppers only would be vulnerable to the potential malicious behavior of the users.
1536-1276/14$31.00 c 2014 IEEE On the other hand, considering the malicious users only would make the system vulnerable to secrecy outage caused by eavesdropping nodes external to the network. For these reasons, it is of critical importance to study broadcast channels with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers.
B. Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BCCE) to model a scenario where both (i) malicious users, and (ii) randomly located external nodes can act as eavesdroppers. This is a practical scenario that has not yet been addressed. We study the performance of RCI precoding in the BCCE in the large-system regime, where the number of users K and the number of transmit antennas N both grow to infinity in a fixed ratio β. While the system performance is difficult to study for finite dimensions, it becomes feasible by assuming large system dimensions. The study of large multi-antenna systems is motivated by the emergence of massive MIMO technologies as a possible means to increase the throughput in the next generation of wireless systems [38] . Moreover, simulations indicate that the results obtained in the largesystem regime are accurate even for finite system dimensions. We use results from both stochastic geometry and random matrix theory. Stochastic geometry is a powerful tool to study a large network with a random distribution of external eavesdroppers [39] , whereas random matrix theory enables a deterministic abstraction of the physical layer, for a fixed network topology [40] . By combining SG and RMT, we can provide explicit expressions for the average large-system performance with respect to the spatial distribution of the nodes and to the fluctuations of their channels. Our main contributions are summarized below.
• We obtain the probability of secrecy outage for the RCI precoder in the BCCE under Rayleigh fading, for the two cases of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. We find that in the large-system regime, the probability of secrecy outage scales as
, where N is the number of transmit antennas and λ e is the density of external eavesdroppers, irrespective of their collusion strategy.
• We derive the large-system mean secrecy rate achievable by the RCI precoder in the BCCE under Rayleigh fading. By comparing the mean secrecy rate to the secrecy rate achievable in the BCC, we obtain an upper bound on the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers, which also scales as
• With the RCI precoder, a regularization parameter ξ is used to tradeoff the signal power at the legitimate user and the crosstalk at the malicious users. We propose a rule for the choice of the regularization parameter ξ of the precoder that maximizes the mean large-system secrecy rate. The proposed choice of ξ is practical, since it does not require knowledge of either the fluctuations of the channels or the spatial locations of the eavesdroppers, and it provides close to optimal performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BBCE) and the secrecy rates achievable with RCI precoding. In Section III, we derive the probability of secrecy outage, for both cases of non-colluding and colluding external eavesdroppers. In Section IV, we derive the mean secrecy rates achievable with RCI precoding in the BCCE, we study the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers, and we propose a practical rule for the choice of the regularization parameter of the precoder. In Section V, we provide several numerical results that confirm the accuracy of the analysis. The paper is concluded in Section VI and future work is suggested.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first recall some results on the MISO BCC, where malicious users connected to the network can act as eavedroppers. Then we introduce the MISO BCCE, where not only malicious users but also nodes external to the network can act as eavesdroppers.
A. Preliminaries: Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages (BCC)
We first consider the downlink of a narrowband MISO BCC, consisting of a base station with N antennas which simultaneously transmits K independent confidential messages to K spatially dispersed single-antenna users. In this model, transmission takes place over a block fading channel, and the transmitted signal is
T ∈ C N ×1 . We assume homogeneous users, i.e., each user experiences the same received signal power on average, thus the model assumes that their distances from the transmitter are the same and unitary. The received signal at user k is given by
where h k,j ∼ CN(0, 1) is the i.i.d. channel between the j th transmit antenna element and the k th user, and n k ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is the noise seen at the k th receiver. The corresponding vector equation is
where
2 , and impose the long-term power constraint E[
It is required that the BS securely transmits each confidential message, ensuring that the unintended users receive no information. This is performed at the secrecy rate R, defined as follows. Let P(E n ) be the probability of error at the intended user, m be a confidential message, y n e be the vector of all signals received by the unintended users, and H(m|y n e ) be the corresponding equivocation. Then a (weak) secrecy rate R for the intended user is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 nR , n) codes such that P(E n ) → 0 and
. . , K} the set of remaining users. In general, the behavior of the users cannot be determined by
the BS. As a worst-case scenario, we assume that for each user k, all users in M k can cooperate to jointly eavesdrop on the k th message. Since the set of malicious users M k can perform joint processing, they can be seen as a single equivalent malicious user M k with K − 1 receive antennas.
While it is known that the sum-capacity of multiuser MIMO systems is achieved by using dirty paper coding (DPC) [8] , DPC requires high-complexity coding schemes that make it too complex to be implemented [10] . Suboptimal precoding schemes have proven to be practical and effective in controlling inter-user interference for the downlink of multi-user MIMO networks [42] . Among those, linear precoding schemes were proposed as a low-complexity alternative to DPC for multiuser MIMO downlink implementations [9] . A popular and practical linear precoding scheme to control inter-user interference is channel inversion (CI) precoding, sometimes known as zero forcing precoding [43] . To increase the sumrate performance of the CI precoder, particularly at low SNR, the regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoder was proposed to tradeoff the inter-user interference and the desired signal through a regularization parameter [12] .
In this paper, we consider RCI precoding, where the transmitted vector x is obtained at the BS by performing a linear processing on the vector of confidential messages 
and ζ = tr
is a long-term power normalization constant. With RCI precoding, linear processing exploiting channel inversion with regularization is applied to the vector of messages u. For each message u k , RCI precoding achieves a tradeoff between the signal power at the k th legitimate user and the crosstalk at the other (K − 1) unintended users. The crosstalk causes interference to the unintended users. In the case when the unintended users are acting maliciously, the crosstalk also causes information leakage. Therefore, RCI achieves a tradeoff between signal power, interference, and information leakage. The function of the regularization parameter ξ ∈ R is to achieve a tradeoff between the signal power at the legitimate user and the interference and information leakage at the other unintended users for each message. When ξ = 0, RCI precoding reduces to a simple channel inversion operation.
Due to cooperation, interference cancellation can be performed at the equivalent malicious user M k , which does not see any undesired signal term apart from the received noise. As a result, a secrecy rate achievable for user k by RCI precoding is given by [25] 
The secrecy rate in (4) is given by the difference between the channel capacity from the transmitter to the legitimate user k and the channel capacity from the transmitter to the equivalent malicious user M k , and the notation [·] + max(·, 0) is used since the secrecy rate is defined as a nonnegative quantity.
In (4), γ k and γ M k are the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios for the message u k at the legitimate receiver k and the equivalent malicious user M k , respectively, given by
and H k is the matrix obtained from H by removing the k th row.
The secrecy rate of the RCI precoder in the large-system regime was studied in [26] , where both the number of receivers K and the number of transmit antennas N approach infinity, with their ratio β = K/N being held constant. The value of β represents the network load. Let ρ > 0, β > 0, and let R BCC,k be the secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding in the BCC defined in (4). Then [26] 
where R
• BCC denotes the secrecy rate in the large-system regime, given by
and where
The optimal value of ξ that maximizes the large-system secrecy rate R
• BCC was obtained in [26] and it is given by ξ • BCC at the top of this page.
B. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages and External Eavesdroppers (BCCE)
We now consider the MISO BCCE, by including external single-antenna eavesdroppers in the system. The spatial location of the external eavesdroppers can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically. However, in many important scenarios, only a statistical description of the positions of the eavesdroppers is available, and thus a stochastic spatial model is more suitable. In particular, since these positions are unknown, we treat them as completely random according to a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP). The spatial PPP is a natural choice in such situations because, given that number of nodes in a region, they are uniformly distributed in the region [28] , [29] , [31] , [32] . The PPP models the most random configuration, and it has maximum entropy among all homogeneous processes. Hence, the PPP serves as a simple and useful model for the position of randomly located nodes in a network. In the following, the external eavesdroppers are assumed to be distributed on the infinite two-dimensional plane according to a PPP Φ e of density λ e [39] . Some of the analysis provided in this paper can be extended to different distributions of external eavesdroppers. However, the case of PPP yields to compact expressions for quantities of interest, such as the probability of secrecy outage and the mean secrecy rate. Fig. 1 shows an example of BCCE, where the BS is at the origin, and the users lie on a disc of radius 1.
In order to guarantee perfect secrecy, we cannot make any assumptions that may limit the eavesdroppers' ability to decode information. Therefore, the analysis provided in the following considers the worst case, which can be regarded as the most interesting. As a worst-case scenario, we assume that each eavesdropper can cancel the interference caused by the remaining K − 1 messages. Assuming that the BS lies at the origin, the SINR γ e,k for the k th message at a generic eavesdropper located in e is then given by
where h † e is the channel vector between the base station and the eavesdropper in e, and it takes into account the Rayleigh fading, and η is the path loss exponent.
Similarly to the BCC, we assume homogeneous users, i.e., each user experiences the same average received signal power. This models a scenario where users are located at equal distances from the BS, or where the BS employs power control to guarantee the same average received signal power. Without loss of generality, such power can be assumed unitary. Although the results presented in this paper can be easily extended to the non-homogeneous case, the assumption of homogeneous users allows analytical tractability, and it yields to closed form expressions for the SINRs at the legitimate user and at the malicious users in the large-system regime.
Some of the results provided in this paper assume a path loss exponent η = 4, which is a reasonable value for η in a shadowed urban area [44] . In this special case, the integrals and the inverse Laplace transform involved in our analysis can be calculated in closed form or in terms of the error function. As a result, for η = 4, it is possible to obtain compact expressions for quantities of interest, such as the probability of secrecy outage and the mean secrecy rate.
The precoding vector w k is calculated independently of h † e , therefore they are independent isotropic random vectors. The channel h † e has unit norm, whereas the precoding vector w k has norm
because it is obtained after the normalization In the following, we consider two types of external eavesdroppers, namely non-colluding eavesdroppers and colluding eavesdroppers. In the non-colluding case, the eavesdroppers individually overhear the communication without centralized processing. In the colluding eavesdroppers case, all eavesdroppers are able to jointly process their received message at a central data processing unit. The secrecy rate R k achievable by the k th user in the BCCE is given by
where γ E,k is the resulting SINR of the PPP of external eavesdoppers for the k th message. The secrecy rate R k is therefore affected by the maximum of the SINR γ M k at the alliance of malicious users and the SINR γ E,k at the external eavesdroppers. In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, γ E,k is the SINR at the strongest eavesdropper. In the case of colluding eavesdroppers, all eavesdroppers can perform joint processing, and they can, therefore, be seen as a single multiantenna eavesdropper. After interference cancellation, each eavesdropper receives the useful signal embedded in noise, and the optimal receive strategy at the colluding eavesdroppers is maximal ratio combining (MRC) which yields to an SINR γ E,k = e∈Φe γ e,k given by the sum of the SINRs γ e,k at all eavesdroppers.
The achievable secrecy sum-rate is denoted by S and defined as S = K k=1 R k .
III. PROBABILITY OF SECRECY OUTAGE
In this section, we derive the secrecy outage probability, i.e., the probability that the secrecy rate R k achievable by user k with RCI precoding in the BCCE is zero, for both cases of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. Then we study the secrecy outage probability in the large-system regime, where the number of users K and the number of transmit antennas N both grow to infinity in a fixed ratio β. We determine how the number of antennas N must scale in order to guarantee a given secrecy outage probability. The secrecy outage probability for user k is defined as [26] , and therefore, the secrecy outage probability is often given by the probability that R k is driven to zero by the presence of external eavesdroppers.
A. Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, γ E,k is the SINR at the strongest eavesdropper E, given by
In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, O k is the probability that any eavesdropper has an SINR greater than or equal to the SINR of the legitimate user k. We obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. The secrecy outage probability for user k in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers is given by
where Γ(·) is the gamma function defined as
Proof: See Appendix A. By applying results from RMT [40] , we now obtain the large-system secrecy outage probability O
• in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers satisfies
Proof: Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 1, by noting that
−→ 0 as N → ∞, and by the continuous mapping theorem [45] . A special case of the previous scenario is the one where only the eavesdropper which is nearest to the base station attempts to eavesdrop. In this case we have
Lemma 2. The secrecy outage probability for user k, caused by the external eavesdropper nearest to the base station, under a path loss exponent η = 4, is given by
Proof: See Appendix B. By applying results from RMT, we now obtain the largesystem secrecy outage probability O
• caused by the eavesdropper which is nearest to the base station. 
Proof: Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 2, by first-order Taylor approximation of (20) , by noting that
−→ 0 as N → ∞, and by the continuous mapping theorem [45] .
B. Colluding Eavesdroppers
The colluding eavesdroppers case represents a worst-case scenario. In this case, all eavesdroppers can perform joint processing, and they can therefore be seen as a single multiantenna eavesdropper. After interference cancellation, each eavesdropper receives the useful signal embedded in noise, and the optimal receive strategy at the colluding eavesdroppers is maximal ratio combining (MRC) [46] . This yields to an SINR γ E,k at the colluding eavesdroppers given by
Lemma 3. The secrecy outage probability for user k in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers, under a path loss exponent η = 4, is given by
Proof: See Appendix C. By applying results from RMT, we now obtain the largesystem secrecy outage probability O
• in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers.
Theorem 3.
The secrecy outage probability in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers, under a path loss exponent η = 4, satisfies
Proof: Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 3, by noting that
−→ 0 as N → ∞, and by the continuous mapping theorem [45] . 
IV. MEAN SECRECY RATES
In this section, we derive the mean secrecy rates, averaged over the location of the external eavesdroppers, achievable by RCI precoding in the BCCE, for both cases of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. We study the mean secrecy rates in the large-system regime, where the number of users K and the number of transmit antennas N both grow to infinity in a fixed ratio β. We then derive a bound on the secrecy rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers. Finally, we propose a rule for the choice of the regularization parameter of the precoder that maximizes the mean of the large-system secrecy rate.
A. Mean Secrecy Rate
We now obtain the following result for the mean secrecy rate at user k. (28) , P k is the probability that the SINR γ E,k at the external eavesdroppers is greater than or equal to the SINR γ M,k at the malicious users, and for a path loss exponent η = 4 is given by
Lemma 4. The mean secrecy rate achievable at user k by RCI precoding in the BCCE is given by
c.e.
(29)
where "n.c.e" and "c.e." stand for "non-colluding eavesdroppers" and "colluding eavesdroppers", respectively, and
) is the distribution of the SINR at the external eavesdroppers, given by
(30)
Proof: See Appendix D. By applying results from RMT, we now obtain the largesystem mean secrecy rate R
• achievable by RCI precoding in the BCCE.
Theorem 4. The mean secrecy rate achievable for user k by RCI precoding in the BCCE satisfies
|E Φe [R k ] − R • | a.s. −→ 0, as N → ∞, ∀k.(31)
R
• denotes the mean secrecy rate in the large-system regime, given by
In (32) , P • is the probability that the SINR γ E,k at the external eavesdroppers is greater than or equal to the large-system SINR γ • M at the malicious users, and for η = 4 it is given by P 
B. Secrecy Rate Loss due to the External Eavesdroppers
By comparing the large-system mean secrecy rate of the BCCE in (32) to the large-system secrecy rate of the BCC without external eavesdroppers in (7), for a given regularization parameter ξ, we can evaluate the secrecy rate loss Δ e due to the presence of external eavesdroppers, defined as
We now obtain an upper bound on the secrecy rate loss Δ e .
Corollary 3. The secrecy rate loss Δ e due to the presence of external eavesdroppers satisfies
where ν is a constant independent of N , λ e , and of the cooperation strategy at the eavesdroppers, given by
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 2. It follows from Corollary 3 that, irrespective of the collusion strategy at the external eavesdroppers, (i) as the number N of transmit antennas grows, the secrecy rate loss
Δ e tends to zero as
, and (ii) increasing the density of eavesdroppers λ e by a factor n requires increasing N by a factor n 2 in order to meet a given value of Δ UB e .
C. Comparison to Existing Results
An upper bound on the per-user secrecy capacity of the MISO BCC is given by the secrecy capacity C MISOME of the MISOME wiretap channel, obtained in [41] . The MISOME wiretap channel is a single-user system with no interference, because only one message is transmitted to one legitimate user at a time, and the remaining users can eavesdrop. The secrecy capacity of the MISOME wiretap channel therefore represents an upper bound on the per-user secrecy capacity of the MISO BCC. It has been shown in [26] that the secrecy rate R
• BCC achievable by RCI precoding in the MISO BCC has the same high-SNR linear scaling factor as the upper bound C MISOME . The high-SNR gap between R • BCC and C MISOME is a constant that depends on β, and it can be found in [26] . Therefore, it follows from Corollary 3 and Remark 2 that for a large number of transmit antennas, the secrecy rate R
• achievable by RCI precoding in the MISO BCCE tends to have the same high-SNR linear scaling factor as an upper bound on the secrecy capacity.
Several contributions can be found in the literature on the secrecy rates achievable in K-user interference channels (IFCs) with confidential messages and/or one external eavesdropper [33] - [37] . In the K-user IFC, each of K singleantenna transmitters sends one message to a single-antenna receiver, and the messages interfere with each other. Unlike the MISO BCC, in the IFC each transmit antenna performs independent processing, and the total number of transmit antennas must be equal to the number of users. It was shown that, for large K, the high-SNR linear scaling factor of the secrecy rate achievable in the IFC is 0.5. This is the same as the linear scaling factor of the secrecy rate R • BCC in (7) for β = 1, i.e., for N = K transmit antennas. Scalingwise separating a single transmitter to multiple interfering transmitters does not cause a loss in terms of DoF per user. From Corollary 3 and Remark 2, it follows that for β = 1 and a large number of transmit antennas, this is also the linear scaling factor of the secrecy rate R
D. Optimal Regularization Parameter
The value of the regularization parameter ξ has a significant impact on the secrecy rates. The optimal large-system regularization parameter of the RCI precoder for the MISO broadcast channel (BC) without secrecy requirements is given by ξ [12] , [15] , [18] . The optimal large-system regularization parameter for the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) was derived in [26] and it is also a function of β and ρ, given by ξ • BCC in (9) . In the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BCCE), we denote by ξ with R
• given in (32) . Since the secrecy rate of the MISO BCCE is affected by the SINR at the external eavesdroppers, the optimal large-system regularization parameter ξ • BCCE is not just a function of β and ρ, but it also depends on the number of transmit antennas N , the density of the eavesdroppers λ e , and their collusion strategy. The value of ξ • BCCE should be found as a compromise between: (i) maximizing the SINR γ • at the legitimate user, and (ii) trading off the SINR γ • M at the malicious users and the probability P
• that the external eavesdroppers are more harmful than the malicious users.
If λ e scales independently of N and K, for low densities λ e , we have by Corollary 3 that R
• approaches R 
, and the secrecy rate R k in (11) is determined solely by γ k and γ E,k . Since γ E,k does not depend on ξ, maximizing the mean rate coincides with the rate maximization problem for the BC, and its solution in the large-system regime is given by ξ • BC . We therefore have the following two extreme cases.
Remark 3. The optimal large-system regularization parameter ξ
• BCCE follows the trend: ξ
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS In this section, we provide numerical results to show the performance of RCI precoding in the BCCE, under a path loss exponent η = 4. We consider finite-size systems, and simulate the probability of secrecy outage, the secrecy rate, and the optimal regularization parameter of the precoder, in different scenarios and under different system dimensions, network loads, SNRs, and densities of eavesdroppers. The simulations show that many results obtained in Section III and Section IV by using random matrix theory and stochastic geometry results hold even for networks with a small number of users and antennas and randomly located eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 2 we compare the simulated probability of outage O k under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, respectively, to the large-system results O
• provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, respectively. In the simulations, the regularization parameter ξ • BCC in (9) was used. We observe that for λ e = 0.1 and small probabilities of secrecy outage, (i)
= 34 yields to a secrecy outage probability smaller than 0.1, (ii) the secrecy outage probability decays as
, and (iii) the collusion of eavesdroppers does not significantly affect the probability of secrecy outage. All these observations are consistent with Corollary 1, Corollary 2, and Remark 1.
In Fig. 3 we compare the simulated ergodic per-antenna secrecy sum-rate under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, to the large-system results from Theorem 4, for λ e = 0.1, N = 10, ξ = ξ • BCC , and various values of β. We note that the accuracy of the large-system analysis decreases with the SNR. The loss of accuracy is due to the limitations of the results used from RMT [18] .
We note from Fig. 3 that the per-antenna secrecy sumrate does not monotonically increase with the SNR. This phenomenon can be explained as follows. Since the alliance of malicious users can cancel the interference, its received SINR is the ratio between the signal leakage and the thermal noise. In the limit of large SNR, the thermal noise vanishes, and the only means for the transmitter to limit the SINR at the malicious users is by reducing the signal leakage to zero by inverting the channel matrix, i.e., by performing zero-forcing. This can only be accomplished when the number of transmit antennas is larger than or equal to the number of users, hence only if β ≤ 1. When β > 1 this is not possible, and the achievable secrecy sum-rate tends to vanish. Similarly, zeroforcing at the external eavesdroppers is not possible unless the number of transmit antennas is larger than the number of external eavesdroppers. One way to avoid this phenomenon is by reducing the transmitted power in order to have a desired value of SNR, as proposed in [26] for β > 1 in the MISO BCC. This yields to a secrecy rate curve that is constant with respect to the SNR. We note that in this scenario, a constant secrecy rate is the maximum that one can achieve, as suggested by an upper bound obtained in [41] for a single-user system without interference.
In Fig. 4 we compare the simulated ergodic per-user secrecy rate under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, to the large-system results from Theorem 4, for β = 1, ρ = 10dB, ξ = ξ • BCC , and various values of λ e . We note that the accuracy of the large-system analysis increases with N . Moreover, we observe that the expectation of the per-user secrecy rate increases with N , and this benefit is more for larger values of λ e . This happens because the mean received power at each external eavesdropper scales as 1 βN , hence having more transmit antennas makes the system more robust against external eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 5 we compare the simulated per-user secrecy rate of (i) the BCCE with non-colluding eavesdroppers, (ii) the BCCE with colluding eavesdroppers, and (iii) the BCC without external eavesdroppers, for β = 1, ρ = 10dB, ξ = ξ • BCC , and various values of λ e . We note that in the BCC, the per-user secrecy rate is almost constant with N , for a fixed network load β. On the other hand, the per-user secrecy rate of the BCCE increases with N . Again, this happens because the mean received power at each external eavesdropper scales as 1 βN , hence having more transmit antennas makes the system more robust against external eavesdroppers. We also note that for higher densities of eavesdroppers λ e , larger values of N are required to achieve a given per-user secrecy rate of the BCCE. More precisely, increasing λ e by a factor 2, requires increasing N by a factor 4. Moreover, the collusion of external eavesdroppers does not affect the scaling law of the mean rate. These observations are consistent with Remark 2. Fig. 6 compares the large-system regularization parameter ξ • BCCE given by (37) to the valueξ BCCE that maximizes the average simulated secrecy sum-rate S, for a finite system with N = 10, β = 1, and ρ = 10dB. The figure shows that for low densities of eavesdroppers λ e , ξ
• BCCE tends to ξ • BCC = 0.0273, whereas for high densities λ e , it tends to ξ • BC = 0.1. These observations are consistent with Remark 3. The finite-system parameterξ BCCE follows a similar trend. We note that both ξ • BCCE andξ BCCE are smaller in the case of noncolluding eavesdroppers, and this can be explained as follows. A smaller value of ξ generates a smaller information leakage to the malicious users. Therefore, it is especially desirable to have a smaller ξ when the malicious users are the main concern, i.e., when their SINR is larger than the SINR at the Density of external eavesdroppers, λ e Optimal regularization parameter Fig. 6 . Comparison between the large-system regularization parameter ξ • BCCE in (37) and the valueξ BCCE that maximizes the average simulated secrecy sum-rate S for a finite system with N = 10 transmit antennas, a network load β = 1, and an SNR ρ = 10dB.
external eavesdroppers, and this is more likely to happen when the external eavesdroppers are not colluding. Fig. 7 shows the loss between using the regularization parameter ξ • BCCE , obtained from large-system analysis, and the regularization parameter ξ BCCE , optimized for each realization of the channels and of the locations of the external eavesdroppers. The figure shows the mean secrecy sum-rate difference S(ξ BCCE ) − S(ξ • BCCE ) normalized by the mean optimal S(ξ BCCE ), simulated for finite-size systems, β = 1, various values of the density of eavesdroppers λ e , and various values of the SNR ρ. Fig. 7 was obtained for colluding eavesdroppers, but similar results were obtained for non-colluding eavesdroppers. We note that calculating the optimal value ξ BCCE requires the base station to know (i) the channels H of all users, (ii) the realization of the PPP Φ e , i.e., the locations of all external eavesdroppers, and (iii) the channels h † e of all external eavesdroppers. On the other hand, calculating ξ • BCCE does not require the knowledge of any of these quantities. We observe that the normalized mean secrecy sum-rate difference is less than 7% for all values of N , λ e , and ρ, and it decreases when N grows, e.g., falling under 3% for N = 20. As a result, one can avoid the calculation of ξ BCCE for every realization of H, Φ e , and h † e , and ξ • BCCE can be used with only a small loss of performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BCCE) under Rayleigh fading, where a multi-antenna base station simultaneously communicates to multiple malicious users, in the presence of randomly located external eavesdroppers. This is the case in a real system, where external nodes are randomly scattered in space. These nodes must be regarded as potential eavesdroppers, otherwise the system would be vulnerable to secrecy outage. The BCCE therefore represents a practical scenario that needs to be addressed. We showed that in the BCCE, irrespective of the collusion strategy at the external eavesdroppers, a large number of transmit antennas N drives both the probability of secrecy outage and the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers to zero. Increasing the density of eavesdroppers λ e by a factor n, requires n 2 as many antennas to meet a given probability of secrecy outage and a given mean secrecy rate. Using the developed analysis, we clearly established the importance of the number of transmit antennas at the BS to make communications robust against malicious users and external eavesdropping nodes. Investigating the secrecy rates in a cellular scenario, where multiple base stations generate inter-cell interference and malicious users of neighboring cells can cooperate, is considered as an interesting future research direction [47] .
APPENDIX A

Proof of Lemma 1:
where (a) follows from the distribution of γ e,k , (b) follows by using x = y, by applying the probability generating functional (PGFL) for the PPP Φ e , given by [39] 
and by changing to polar coordinates. Moreover, in (c) we
, and (e) follows from the definition of the gamma function
APPENDIX B (11) is zero with probability one. If γ k > γ M k , we have for the eavesdropper nearest to the BS
Proof of Lemma 2:
where (a) holds because h † E w k 2 ∼ exp( 1 Nβ ), and (b) holds because the distance E between the base station and the nearest eavesdropper E has distribution [48] f E (x) = 2λ e πx exp(−λ e πx 2 ).
For a path loss exponent η = 4, (42 
where (a) holds since Φ e is a PPP [49] , (b) follows since the fading is independent of the point process, and (c) follows since h † x w k 2 ∼ exp( 
By inverse transform one can obtain the distribution function [50] f γ E,k (y) = π 
which integrated yields the cumulative distribution function
from which the secrecy outage probability in (25) can be calculated as O k = F γ E,k (γ k ).
APPENDIX D
Proof of Lemma 4:
We note from (11) that when γ k ≤ γ M k , the secrecy rate R k is zero ∀ γ E,k . When γ k > γ M k , the mean secrecy rate is given by
where (i) 1 (·) is the indicator function, (ii) O k P (γ E,k ≥ γ k ) is given by the secrecy outage probability; (iii)
is the probability that the SINR at the external eavesdroppers is greater than or equal to the SINR at the malicious users, given in (29) and obtained by calculations similar to the ones in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2; and (iv) f γ E,k (y) is the distribution of the SINR at the external eavesdroppers, given by (48) for colluding eavesdroppers, and by 
where (a) holds because P • > O • , log 2 (1 + y) ≤ y, and
